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UTAH FUNERAL DIRECTORS & .EMBAI..MEn.s .·l _,··
· · ASSOCIATION, a Utah corporation, on beha:lf
of its members, and on behalf of others similarly
situated,
·
Plaintiffs - Appellant,
-Vs.MEMORIAL GARDENS OF THE VALLEY~ INC.~
a Utah corporation; MEMORIAL TRU$TS; INC., . .
. Case , ..
a Utah corporation; LAKE .HILLS, a Utah .cor- • No. 10236
poration; AULTOREST MEMORIAL CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; HAL S. BENNETT,
DONALD HACKING and RAYMOND W. GEE,
members of the Business Regulation Commission
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Commissioner of Insurance of the State of· Utah;
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and as amended in Chapter 45, Laws of Utah 1957. Plaintiffs further sought a declaratory Judgment decreeing
that the p:re-need contracts (R. 8-12, 19-20 and 39-41)
issued and sold by the Defendants, and through their associates, are insurance contracts, in consequence of which,
said Contracts and the Defendants would .be subject to
the Insurance Regulations of the State of Utah supervising said Contracts as Insurance Contracts and said
Defendants as Insurance Companies. This Court is req nested to determine the issues of this case from the
pleadings in the Record of the lower Court, and the copies
of the pre-need contracts and affidavits, also that part of
the Record which is either part of the pleading'S or which
has been made part of the record otherwise (R. 8-12,
19-20, 39-41 a.nd 35).
In this case it is necessary that the Plaintiffs, and it
should be of interest to the Defendants, to know the legality of the practices complained of. The corporate Defendants carry on activities which vitally affect every
mortician and funeral director in the state and leave such
morticians and funeral directors in a dilemma.
If in fact the practices are legal, then it is essential
that the various morticians and funeral directors· coopera.te under one or more of the plans carried on by the defendants or a similar plan by some other company; if
they fail to do so they will suffer a competitive disadvantage which will directly · and detrimentally affect the
business which they carry on. In fact, it is not too much
to say that if the business practices carried on by the
corporate defendants are legal, within the not too distant
2
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future the vast majority of funerals conducted in the
State of Uta4 will be conducted pursuant to financing
plans instituted by one of these defendants or someone
else in a similar business. Therefore, any mortician or
funeral director that did not cooperate in such a plan
might find it difficult to continue to exist.
On the other hand, if such plans are illegal, the Plaintiffs might well, if they cooperate in such plans, find themselves guilty of unethical c.onduct and find their license
subject to revocation.
The Plaintiffs, therefore, seek a Construction, and a
determination of the validity and legality, of the p·ractices complained of, and the Contracts before the Court.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This Case was brought before the Lower Court for
a Determination of the issues on a Motion for a Summary Judgment (R. 32-35) asking for a declaration:
(a) That a licensed Embalmer or Funeral Director
performing services pursuant to a pre-need contract obtained by solicitation is guilty of unprofessional and unethical conduct as defined in Sections 58-9-10 and 22 of
U 0 A 1953 and subject themselves to a possible revocation of their license.
(b) That pre-need contracts providing future funeral services such as those used by the Defendants are
insurance contracts and are not legally issued unless the
company issuing the same qualifies as an insurance company under the insurance laws of Utah.

3
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· (c) That pre-need contracts are in violation of law
unless they provide' that' all the earnings and interest on
monies paid in shall be held in trust until death of beneficiary and 'paid to no other person but the named payor
as provided in Sections 22-4-1 to 22-4-7 as enacted hy
Chapter 39, Laws of Utah 1955 and as amended in Chapter 45, Laws of Vtah 1957.
The matter was argued before the Court without
'introduction of further evidence. The Defendants raised
the. issues of, and challenged (a) the constitutionality of
portions of the pre-need law in Title 22, Chapter 4,
Supra; and (b) whether or not there was a justiciable
issue between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants and before the Court and the capacity of the party Plaintiffs
to sue.
The lo"rer Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for
Summary Judgment; decided in favor of the Defendants
on their claim that certain portions of the pre-need law
are unconstitutional; and found in favor of the Plaintiffs
declaring that the Plaintiffs had legal standing to prosecute the action and that there existed a justiciable issue
between the Plaintiffs and Defendants.
The Plaintiffs respectfully refer the Court to the
final decree of the lower Court as contained in the lower
Court's Record on file herein (R. 44-48).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
A review is hereby sought from this Honorable Court,
under the Plaintiffs' rights of appeal, of the decision of
4
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the lower Court. The Plaintiffs feel that the lower Court
~rred i~ its decisions in the particulars set out by the
Plaintiffs in their Statement of Points which f?llow and
s~ek a reversal of the lower. Court's decision on those
points.

STATEMENT OF POINTS

I.
THAT CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S DECISION, ANY FUNERAL DIRECTOR OR
EMBALMER, WHO PERFORMS FUNERAL
SERVICES OR FURNISHES BURIAL FACILITIES PURSUANT TO A PRE-NEED
CONTRACT OBTAINED BY SOLICITATION
BY EITHER OF THE DEFENDANTS, SOLICITED OR SOLD BY AND FOR THEMSELVES,· OR WHICH RESULTS TO THE
BENEFIT OF A FUNERAL DIRECTOR OR
EMBALMER WHO PERFORMS THE FU~
NERAL SERVICES OR FURNISHES THE
BURIAL FACILITIES, IS GUILTY OF UNPROFESSIONAL AND UNETHICAL CONDUCT AS DEFINED IN SECTIONS 58-9-10
AND 58-9-22 OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953..
II.
THAT CONTRARY TO THE LOWER COURT'S
DECISION, THE CONTRACTS SOLD BY THE
DEFENDANTS ARE ALL SUBJECT TO THE
PRE-NEED LAW OF UTAH, AND.THE CONTRACT USED AND ISSUED BY THE DEFENDANT, ME:M:ORIAL TRUST,· INC., IS
PARTICULARLY IN VIOLATION O:Ir THE

5
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PRE-NEED LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AS CONTAINED IN SECTION 22-4-4, CHAPTER 39, LAWS OF UTAH, 1955 AND AS
AMENDED IN CHAPTER, 45, LAWS OF
UTAH, 1957, AND THAT SAID DEFENDANTS' PRE-NEED CONTRACT PARTICULARLY PERMITS SAID DEFENDANT TO
DEMAND AND RECEIVE THE EARNINGS
OF THE TRUST FUNDS AND PAY SAID
FUNDS TO SAID DEFENDANT CONTRARY
TO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID SECTION
22-4-4 AFORESAID.
III.
THAT CONTRARY TO THE LOWER COURT'S
DECISION, THE PRE-NEED CONTRACTS,
BEING SOLD BY THE DEFENDANT COMpANIES AND WHICH ARE THE SUBJECTS
·oF THE CONTROVERSY IN THIS CASE,
ARE INSURANCE CONTRACTS AND SUBJECT TO THE INSURANCE LAWS OF THIS
STATE AND THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO
REGULATION BY THE UTAH STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, AND THAT THE
SAID DEFENDANT COMPANIES, ISSUING
SAID CONTRACTS ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO
THE INSURANCE LAWS OF UTAH AND
THE REGULATIONS OF THE STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE
OF UTAH.
IV.
THAT CONTRARY TO THE LOWER COURT'S
DECISION, THOSE PORTIONS OF SECTIONS 22-4-1 22-4-2 22-4-4 22-4-5 AND 22-4-7
'
' LAW' OF THE STATE
OF THE PRE-NEED
6
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OF UTAH, CHAPTER 39 OF THE 1955 LAWS
OF UTAH AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 45
OF THE 1957 LAWS OF UTAH AND WHICH
SECTIONS ARE QUOTED IN THE LOWER
COURT'S AMENDED JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL, DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 1964
(R. 46) ARE CONSTITUTIONAL.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S DECISION, ANY FUNERAL DIRECTOR OR
:JTIMBALMER, WHO PERFORMS FUNERAL
SERVICES OR FURNISHES BURIAL F AGILITIES PURSUANT TO A PRE-NEED CONTRACT OBTAINED BY SOLICITATION BY
EITHER OF THE DEFENDANTS, SOLICITED OR SOLD BY AND FOR THEMSELVES,
OR WHICH RESULTS TO THE BENEFIT OF
A FUNERAL DIRECTOR OR EMBALMER
WHO PERFORMS THE FUNERAL SERVICES OR FURNISHES THE BURIAL F AGILITIES, IS GUILTY OF UNPROFESSIONAL
AND UNETHICAL CONDUCT AS DEFINED
IN SECTIONS 58-9-10 AND 58-9-22 OF THE
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
Those portions of Sections 58-9-10 and 58-9-22 of the
Utah Code Annotated 1953 that are pertinent to this
Appeal read as follows:

58-9-10: ''The words 'unprofessional conduct'
as relating to embalming are hereby defined to include:* * *
(7) Solicitation of dead human bodies by a.
registered apprentice or licensed embalmer, or
7
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their agents, assistants or employees, whether
such solicitation occurs before or after death • • •
(8) Employment, :directly or indirectly, of atny
app·renlice, agent, assistant, embalmer, employee,
or other person, on part or full time or on commission, for the purpose of calling upon individuals
or institutions by whose influence · dead human
bod.ies may be· turned over to· a p·artic'ldar mortu. ary establishment, funeral director, or embalmer;
provided this provision shall not he deemed to prevent and prohibit the solicitation for sale of
crypts, burial lots or cremation services by a licensee or his. employee.
( 9) The buying of business by the licensee, his
agents, assistants or employees, or the direct or
indirect payment or offer of payment of a commis. sion by the licensee, his agents, assistants or employees for the purpose of securing business; or
the direct or indirect giving or offering to give
any bonus, or gift for the purpose of securing
business.
58-9-22: The words ''unprofessional Conduct''
a.s they relate to this act, are hereby defined to
include : * * * ·
(c) Solicitation of funeral business by the
licensee, his agents, assistants or employees,
whether such solicitation occurs before or
after death * * *

(d) Employment by the licensee of persons known as ''capers'' (cappers) or ''steerers'' or ''solicitors'' or other such persons to
obtain funeral directing or embalming business .

. (e) Employment, directly or indirectly,
of amy apprentice, agen.t, assista;nt, embalmer,
ernployee or other person, on part or full time,

8
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or on commission, for the purpose of calling
upon individuals or institutions by w·hose influence dead bodies may be turned over to a
particular funeral director. • * *
(f) The buying of business by the licensee, his agents, assistants or employees, or
the direct or indirect payment .or offer of

payment of a commission, bonus ·or gift by
the licensee, his agents, assista;nts or employees for the purpose of securing business.''
(Emphasis added) ·
Regardless of the way in which it might he said, the
purpose of such statutes in the various states is, to eliminate unnecessary commercialization of death; to curtail
any practice that resembles competitive bids for dead
bodies ; and to generally denounce and label as unprofessional and unbecoming, the solicitation of dead bodies
for _burial except by accepted and approved methods
of general advertising.
A determination of this question will decide whether
or not funeral directors and embalmers are going to be
permitted to raise themselves to the status of a profession, or whether they are going to be governed by the
more relaxed rules of open and cut-throat competition
with its many flagrant abuses and fraudulent practices.
These laws have been upheld as constitutional and are
supported in one form or another by most, if not all,
states.
The Defendants are contending that they do not operate directly as either a Funeral Director or an Em9
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balmer, and that they are not subject to the unprofessional conduct statutes herein referred to. That they are
free to solicit, negotiate, sell, and perform all the commercial a<}ts related to the solicitation of dead human bodies prohibited to funeral directors and embalmers a.s evidenced by the pleadings in this case and the contracts of
every Defendant of record in this case. They all promise to furnish, among other things, a complete funeral,
embalming and interment, either through their own facilities, or the facilities of licensed funeral directors and
embalmers of the State~ (R. 8, 9, 12, 19, 40 rear side) It
is interesting to note the efforts of the Defendants to
disengage themselves from the effect o~ the Statute when
in actual practice they are engaging in all the essential
activities of funeral directors and embalmers or selling
for themselves or selling their services to licensed funeral directors and embalmers of the State of Utah. If
they are not acting as a funeral director or an embalmer,
they c.an 't possibly escape the relationship of being
either ''agents, assistants, employees, cappers, steerers,
solicitors, or other persons'' on part or full time, or on
commission, for the purpose of calling upon individuals
so a.s to have the dead human bodies turned over to themselves or a particular funeral director even though he
is later to be designated. (Sec. 58-9-10 (8) and 58-9-22
(e) U C A 1953 quoted above) The violation, and the
evil, is in acts of solicitation which are intended to benefit, and do result in benefiting, licensed funeral directors
contrary to the statute. The evil is not less vile, less unethical, nor less evil because it is committed by the
defendants.

10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Note that Defendant, Memorial Gardens of the Valley (R 8) as the ''Company," agrees to do every act done
by a. licensed funeral director and embalmer. If they
were licensed· as funeral directors they could not solicit.
Why should they be allowed to do so for themselves or
others just because they have no license.
Defendant Memorial Trusts, Inc., agree to provide
everything that goes with a funeral. They agree that
such services are "to be performed by a listed Mortuary
or other Mortuary'' selected by the heirs of the deceased. (R. 9) This is also the Agreement ofthe Defendant Aultorest Memorial Corporation, who agree to
''cause a complete funeral'' to be conducted at their
expense. ( R. 12)
Note that Defendant Lake Hills also agrees to a complete funeral but that those ''funeral services can only
be performed by a mortuary authorized by Lake Hills."
(R. 40 rear side) Again the Defendants urge full rights
to violate the unprofessional conduct statute even though
they are openly and conspicuously soliciting either for
themselves or licensed funeral directors. They claim immunity only because they are not licensed as funeral
directors or embalmers.
If a licensed embalmer or funeral director violates
the provision against solicitation, his license is subject
to revocation. The question here to be- determined is
whether or not funeral .directors and embalmers being
themselves prohibited from soliciting may, through subterfuge, enjoy the fruits of solicitation. .It appears that
ll
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the corporate defendants find themselves in a dilemma
in regard to this matter. If in fact they are qualified
themselves to render the services as embalmers or fu~
neral directors, they certainly are in direct violation of
the statute if they solicit. If they themselves are unable
to render the s·ervices in question, the sale of an agree:.
:inent automatically makes them subject to the insurance
code, as we : will discuss in a later succeeding section,
but does not relieve the licensed funeral directors or
embalmers with whom they do business of the obligation
to observe the ethical standards of his profession. If in
fact those of the corporate defendants who are not quali~
fled to render embalming or funeral directing services
have a pre-existing agreement, however informal it may
be, with any licensed embalmer or funeral directors that
such licensed embalmer or funeral director, or one to be
named or designated later, will render the services contracted for by such Defendant, then the Defendant be~
comes the agent or representative of the funeral director
or e-mbalmer so concerned, and while the Defendants
claim the ethical rules of the profession would not affect
the Defendant sales company, it 'vould affec-t the licensed
embalmer or funeral director for \vhom they purport
to act.
The Plaintiffs maintain the Defendants are all violating the unprofessional conduct statute above quoted
because of their acting as agents, employees and representatives of the particular licensed funeral director and
embalmer involved. That by a relationship such as this,
they also jeopardize the license of the licensed funeral

12
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director. The Defendants' case is an admission they are
soliciting, but they want immunity. The Plaintiffs, in this
appeal, do not contend that the Defendants are under an
express contract of appointment with any licensed funeral_ director in the State of Utah, with arrangements
for direct payments of compensation, through commissions or otherwise. The Plaintiffs do claim that that
which is illegal and forbidden to be accomplished directly, cannot be legal if accomplished indirectly. The
Defendants have elected to put themselves in the position of giving and providing to any licensed funeral
director, who will accept benefits under, and who will
agree to carry out their contracts indirectly, the full benefits of the very acts of solicitation, which the licensed
funeral directors and embalmers are otherwise prohibited
to practice or turn to his benefit, whether by his own
acts or the acts of his agents or employees.
One thing is certain, that the Pre-need Contracts of
the Defendants, already referred to in this case, are not
the simple contracts made between two parties where
Party A assumes burdens for which he is re.sponsible on
the one hand and Party B in consideration thereof,
assumes burdens for which he is responsible on the
other.
It is equally as certain that even though the contracts in question purportedly are between A and B
parties, these contracts do have the distinctive additional
feature of providing that a third party, namely a licensed
funeral director and embalmer in the State of Utah shall
be~ the party to carry out and perform the provisions of

13
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the pre-need contract of the defendants. At the time the
Contract is consumated, both of the original parties
contemplate and state in open, express terms that alicensed funeral director and embalmer shall, upon election, and if willing, be the performing party. The buyer
knows he must look to someone beyond the Defendants
(agent) to get what he has purchased. (Restatement of
the Law, 2nd Edition, Agency, Section 85, p. 217.)
This is agency by ratification. In this latter situation which is the case before the Court, we find all the·
elements necessary to create that relationship.
The first essential to the relationship is that the
Agent has no authority to bind his principal. In our
cases the Defendants set out in their contracts 'Yhat the
funeral directors will do but this does not bind the funeral director because the inclusion of the funeral directors is unauthorized. (Sec. 208 of Agency, .Vol. 2,
American Juris prudence) When the funeral director
is later selected and agrees to perform, he is bound to the
contract as written by the defendant and is subject to
every provision in the contract and every rule applicable
to the relationship of ratification by a principal.
The funeral director or embalmer, if and when he
agrees to go ahead (ratify), has no right to change the
terms without consent and must accept the contract
terms as written. This acceptance or ratification by the
funeral director makes the acts of the Defendants in selling the contract, the act of the funeral director as though
the funeral director himself had created the contract
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in the beginning. (See Moses v. Arch. McFa.rla.nd & Sons
(Utah 1951), 119 Utah 602 ; 230 Pac. 2nd 571, 573 ; also
Yellow Jacket Boat Co. v. Little Glasses Corp. (Okla.
1959), 338 Pac. 2nd 1105).
Any funeral director that accepts, and agrees to
perform, even though he. has been merely described, or
listed as one of a specific group, causes his '' ratification" and his obligation to perform to be equally as
binding as though he had been named and identified by
name. Agency law does say there must be an identification of the principal to have agency by ratification. In
Restatement of the Law on Agency, 2nd Edition, Sections 85 and 87, we read as follows :
85. Subsection 1 (c) Principal Unidentified:
It is not necessary that the purported principal
be identified; it is sufficient that the person acting
should purport to act as agent for another, but if
he describes the other by name or otherwise, only
a person coming within the description so given,
if any, can ratify. If the description applies to
two persons equally, only the one on whose aceount
he intends to act can ratify.
87(a)-* * * If he (the acting person) identifies the purported principal, it is only the affirmance of such person which can result in rati:fieation. * * * if a partial description is given, only a
person who comes within it and who was intended
by the person can ratify-* * *
Plaintiffs maintain the Defendants are, under these
rules, agents of the funeral director or any other persons
who perform under their contracts and are therefore
15
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subject to the unprofessional conduct laws referred to on
solicitation. What is further serious, such actions jeopardize the position of the funeral director and make
them also violators and subject to the loss of their licenses under the provisions of the la:ws referred to because they become liable as if they had been in on the contract from the beginning and must take the burdens as
well as benefits.It is obvious that the Defendants are doing all they
can to avoid being called agents. In reality they do purport to act for another (the funeral director). The relationship they create, with its resulting obligation and
rights, determines what that relationship amounts to,
rather than their explanations of wha.t they hope they
are doing, whether written or oral. In situations bordering on undisclosed principals, and situations where the
acting party actually involves a third party, as in the
ca.se before the Court, but avoids calling him a principal,
and tries to make it appear he is acting for himself
rather than a.s an agent, as the Defendants are trying
to do here, the majority of Courts are holding it as
agency by ratification. (See Barnett Bros. v. Lynn (Wn.
·'22), 203 Pac. 389; also the classification identified as· a
class five in 22 Columbia Law Review, p. 467.)
ARGUMENT
POINT II.
THAT CONTRARY TO THE LOWER
COURT'S DECISION, THE CONTRACTS
SOLD BY THE DEFENDANTS ARE ALL
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SUBJECT TO THE PRE-NEED LAW OF
UTAH AND THE CONTRACT USED AND ISSUED BY THE DEFENDANT, MEMORIAL
TRUST, INC., IS PARTICULARLY IN VIOLATION OF THE PRE-NEED LAW OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, AS CONTAINED IN SECTION 22-4-4, CHAPTER 39, LAWS OF UTAH,
1955 AND AS AMENDED IN CHAPTER 45,
LAWS OF UTAH, 1957, AND THAT SAID DEFENDANTS' PRE-NEED CONTRACT PARTICULARLY PERMITS SAID DEFENDANTS
TO DEMAND AND RECEIVE THE EARNINGS OF THE TRUST FUNDS AND PAY
SAID FUNDS TO SAID DEFENDANT CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID SECTION 22-4-4 AFORESAID.
Utah's pre-need statute was enacted by the 1955 Legislature. The purpose of the act was to regulate the
selling of funeral services and personal property used
in connection with the burying of the dead p-rior to the
time that the need for such arises, and to require the
companies selling such services to place the monies received in trust. The pu~pose, of course, is to protect
the individuals who purchase the services, and to make
sure that the money to pay for the same will be available when the need arises. Section 22-4-1, U. C. A. 1953,
states:
''Payments for pre-arranged funeral plans
constitute trust funds - Decedent beneficiary Trustee, - Any payment of money made to any
person, firm or eorporation upon any agreement
or contract, or any series or combination of
agreements or contracts, which has for a p·urpose the furnishing or performance of funeral
services, under a pre-arranged funeral plan, or
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the furnishing or delivery of any personal property, ·merchandise, or services of any nature, but
exclud.ing cem.etery lots, vaults, crypts, n,iches,
cemetery burial privileges, an.d cemetery space, in
connection with the final disposition of a dead human body, for future use at a time determinable
by the death of the person or persons for whose
benefit any such agre·ement has been made and
whose body or bodies are to be disposed of, such
deceased person to be known in this act as the decedent beneficiary, shall be held to be trust funds,
and the person, partnership, association or corporatiQn receiving such payments is hereby declared to be a trustee thereof.'' (Emphasis added)
The purpose of the exemption set forth in the italiciz.ed words above was obviously to exempt the sale of
such items as are covered by Chapter 4, Title 8, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, regarding cemeteries. It, therefore, a.pp·ea.;rs that Sec. 24-4-1 was intended to include all
items used in connection with the burial of the dead
which are not subject to provisions of Chapter 4, Title
8. The contracts of the defendants provide for full funeral services including embalming. They also provide
for caskets and other personal property used in connection with the burial of the dead. However, so long as
they do not come within the category of crypts or vaults,
they are clearly within the pre-need statute regardless of
'vhether or not the individual can take delivery if he so
chooses when he completes payment, but before he dies.
It cannot be overemphasized that the purpose of the
pre-need law is to guarantee the presence of moneys and
their preservation to the time when the funds will be
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needed. Protection is afforded against insolvency of the
person entrusted with the funds, against his going out of
business and even his death; against fraud, theft and
even arrangements of any and all kinds, legal, fraudulent
or otherwise which permits said trust funds to be deleted, diverted, shared or otherwise used by others than
the beneficiaries protected by the pre-need law.
The very simple fact persists that the defendants
are receiving payments from others for the purposes set
out in Section 22-4-1 U.C.A. 1953 as set out above. Therefore, the Plaintiffs insist that the only consistent position is, that the Defendants must deposit those collected
funds in trust as p-rovided in said pre-need law.
Defendant MEMORIAL. TRUSTS, INC., does deposit their funds in trust while the others claim thems~lves exempt.
The objection to the Memo.rial Trusts contract (R. 9)
under the pre-need statute is that the purchaser appoints
Memorial Trusts, Inc., as its ''agent to demand and receive earnings of the trust fund and to pay the same to
itself in exchange for and in consideration of the agreement of Memorial Trusts, Inc., to guarantee the services
and facilities above set forth regardless of future price
increase.'' That this provision constitutes a contract of
insurance "\vill be discussed in a. later section. However
.
'
it also quite clearly offends against the provisions of Sec.
22-4-4, U.C.A., 1953, which provides in part as follows:
''All payments and amounts so deposited, with
all earnings and interest thereon, shall not be
19
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withdrawn until the death of the sole or one of the
beneficiaries, * * *. ' '
A provision in the contract, therefore, to the effect that
Memorial Trusts, Inc., has the right to withdraw the
earnings on deposit and pay it to itself, is in clear contradiction of the statute. Either the law is in effect or it
isn't if its purposes are to be accomplished. Imagine
someone accepting deposits of money from groups of
individuals and trying to make himself exempt from the
Banking, the Insurance or the Securities Laws by merely
getting a waiver from the Depositor. The pre-need law
is affording equal protection in its field and is entitled
to equal consideration and enforcement.

ARGUMENT
POINT III
THAT CONTRARY TO THE LOWER
COURT'S DECISION, THE PRE-NEED CONTRACTS, BEING SOLD BY THE DEFENDANT COMPANIES AND WHICH ARE THE
SUBJECTS OF THE CONTROVERSY IN
THIS CASE, ARE INSURANCE CONTRACTS
AND SUBJECT TO THE INSURANCE LAWS
OF THIS STATE AND THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO REGULATION BY THE UTAH
STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, AND
THAT THE SAID DEFENDANT COMPANIES, ISSUING SAID CONTRACTS ARE ALSO
SUBJECT TO THE INSURANCE LAWS OF
UTAH AND THE REGULATIONS OF THE
STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT OF
THE STATE .OF UTAH.
20
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The Plaintiffs represent that the Defendant companies, Memorial Gardens of the Valley~ Inc., Memorial
Trusts, Inc., Lake Hills, and the Aultorest Memorial Corporation, are all selling insurance contracts. These con~
tracts are being sold primarily as p·re-need contracts providing for funeral benefits under such titles as benevolent funds, trust funds, and funeral benefits. The. Plaintiffs maintain these contracts are all subject to the insurance laws of the State of Utah; that the sellers of such
contracts should qualify and be licensed as insurance
companies under the insurance laws of the state of Utah;
and that such contracts should also be qualified and approved as insurance contracts as the state law provides.
None of the Defendant companies listed above has qualified before, nor have any of them received permission
from the Utah State Insurance Commissioner to operate as an Insurance Company.
A general proposition in all governmental control
and regulation is that all states exercise regulatory control in all cases where any person, corporate or natural,
takes another's money and either uses it or exercises
control thereover. .A..ll of these possibilities are encompassed in and under either the banking and finance
la,vs, the la'v of investments, or insurance laws. If someone takes another's money for any purpose outside the
field of sales and transfers, he fails under some regulation
set up for one or more of those three named categories.
Any type of organization that takes over the control of
another's money and tries to a.void qualifying under one
of those three groups, opens the 'vay for fraud, misuse
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of funds, and other losses to the individual which is not
in the public interest.
The named defendant companies are accepting, and
controlling the funds of others without meeting the safeguards set up by Utah law. The Plaintiffs specifically
point out that these named defendant companies are selling insurance contracts, and should, at least, be required
to qualify as insurance companies.
Section 31-5-2 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
provides:
( 1) ''No insurer shall transact any insurance in
this state other than as surplus lines insurer, except that author1zed by a valid and existing certificate of authority issued to it by the commissioner.''

Our Utah State Insurance Department is charged
with the enforcement of the Insurance Laws. (Sec. 31-2-1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.)
The contracts of the Defendant companies on file
in this case (R. 8-12, 19, 20, 39-41), and which were either
submitted, or have been admitted as being used, by the
said Defendant companies, vary in some minor respects
as to the benefits promised, but the Plaintiffs desire to
point out certain pertinent similarities common in all
of the contracts involved herein. All of these contracts
promise to deliver, at some unknown future date, certain
funeral merchandise as yet unidentified, and funeral services at the time a death occurs, or on demand, which can
22
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only be interpreted as also after death. We later desire
to·point out the law in reference to this matter. All contracts on file herein being issued by the Defendant companies agree to furnish caskets, clothing, embalming
services, funeral services, transportation, and grave services, including vaults in most contracts. Every contract
involved herein agrees to obtain the services of another
funeral director, or any of certain listed funeral directors
to perform the funeral services. All of these contracts
provide for refunds upon demand.
Defendant, Memorial Gardens of the Valley, Inc.,
also .agrees to provide endowment care and bronze tablets or memorials (R. 8).
Defendant, Memorial Trusts, Inc., further agreed to
provide plastic surgery when necessary and musicians
(R. 19). This Defendant also specifically provides for an
appointment from the purchaser so that said Defendant
company can act as an agent to receive and hold monies
for the benefit of the purchaser to be used in providing
the funeral benefits 'vhen death occurs (R. 9 and 19). This
makes the contract strongly and definitely a contract
of insurance.
In substance, these Defendant companies agree to
take and hold, or in other ways keep control of the funds
of another until death occurs, and the benefits are needed
for a funeral. We submit that these are the elements
of life insurance.
There are innumerable Supreme Court decisions
holding these types of contracts as insurance contracts.
23
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The Plaintiffs desire to point out specifically that in all
of these Supreme Court cases no distinction is made between, and it makes no difference to the Courts, whether
these contracts are sold by and through a funeral director, or whether by and through an association, agency,
or a company which is separate and op·erates apart from
one or more funeral directors.
Section 31-1-7 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
defines Insurance as follows:
''Definition of Insurance - Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes to pay indemnity,
or pay a specified amount, upon determinable
contingencies.''
Insurance is further defined in 44 C. J. S. under Insurance, Sec. 1, page 471, a.s follows :
'' * * * Insurance denotes a. contract by which
one party for a compensation * * * assumes particular risks of the other party, and promises to
pay to him, or his nominee a. certain, or ascertainable sum of money on a specified contingency;
an agreement by which one party for a consideration promises to pay money, or its equivalent, or
do some act of value to the insured, on the destruction or injury of something in which the latter has an interest.''

See also 29 .Am. Jur. on Insurance, Section 3, page 433.
In the case of State (by the Attorney General) v.
Mutual Mortuary Association, Inc. (Tenn. 1933), 61 S.W.
2d 664, an association was involved writing contracts
promising a complete burial at one of several listed
24
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prices. The Court in that case listed and followed numerous cases from several jurisdictions and said :
''As to t;he first co~tention, we think the business
is clearly insurance. The contract evidenced by
the certificate has all of the elements of a life insurance contract. It is an agreement to perform
a service which can become obligatory only on the
death of the certificate holder. While no beneficiary of the promisee is named, in reality one
exists; and may be ascertained with as much certainty as if directly and specifically named. It is
the person who would otherwise be obligated to
pay the expenses of the burial. This may be the
heir of the estate of the decedent, his relatives, or
the state; but, whoever such person may be, he is
relieved of his obligation to the exent of the value
of the service agreed to be performed by the terms
of the certificate. There is, therefore, a promise
by one person to perform a valuable service on
the death of another, a valuable consideration paid
for the promise, and a person to whom the benefit
of the promise 'vill inure. Had the ordinary insurance nomenclature been used to designate the
person making the promise, the person to "\\"hom
the promise is made, the person "\Vho will receive
the benefit of the promise, and the consideration
paid for the promise, no one "\vould question that
it was an insurance contract. But a contract is
to be determined from its nature and effect, not
by the terminology used to characterize it. I-Iere
is an ''insurer'' an ''insured,'' a ''premium,''
and a ''beneficiary,'' and we think the contract
nothing else than a plain, ordinary insurance contract.'~

''Our statutes, which provide for the regulation
and oversight of insurance companies and their
agents were designed to protect policyholders
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against fraud, imposition, insolvency, and misappropriation of funds. Industrial policies especially are frequently issued to persons who' are
poor, illiterate, improvident, and unable to protect themselves.''
In the case of Sisson, by the Attorney General, v.
Prata Undertakin,g Company (Rhode Island, 1928), 141
Atl. 76. The Defendant was selling contracts providing
for complete funeral services including furnishings, materials, casket and other funeral necessities, all for a
regular payment of money. The Court in that case held
that the contract was an insurance contract, and stated:
''Burial Insurance is a contract based upon a legal consideration whereby the obligor undertakes
to furnish the obligee, or his near relatives, at
death, a burial reasonably worth a fixed sum.''
Please note that in all of these cases already quoted,
and to be quoted, the sellers of these contracts have called
them by various names, such as : ''leases,'' ''options,''
''benevolent funds,'' ''discount contracts,'' ''trusts,''
''notes,'' and other titles to which the Courts have paid
no attention as pointed out in the case above from Tennessee. The Courts are not concerned with the contracts' names if the elements of insurance are present.
In Sta,te (by the State Insurance Commissioner) v.
Stout (Tenn. 1933), 65 S.W. 2d 827, 829, the defendant
who was operating a burial society "'"rote contracts providing for funeral benefits, funeral furnishings, and a
complete funeral outfit to be furnished by and through
de signa ted undertakers. The Court also held this as an
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insurance contract subjecting the company to qualify
under the State Insurance laws, and held as follows :
'' * * * It is also declared that the business which
the society or company is actually carrying on,
and not the mere form of the organization, is the
test for determining whether an insurer is a benefit society or insurance company so as to be within a statute applying to insurance companies.
Again, that the status of an association or society is fixed by the character of the business
transacted, and not by the mere formal 'vorkings
of the organization. So it has been said that the
rights of persons claiming under a contract must
be fixed thereby without regard to the character
of the society. And, if the prevalent purpose be
that of insurance, the existence of benevolent or
charitable features does not affect the legal status
of an insurance company.''

In a more recent case, State (by the State Insurance
Commissioner) v. Mynatt Funeral Home (Tenn. 1960),
339 S.W. 2d 26 the Defendant funeral home agreed to furnish all necessary merchandise and funeral services on
demand, or on death. The Court held this contract to be
one of insurance, and pointed specifically, commenting on
the fact that in twenty years of activity the Defendant
had issued 35,000 contracts, and allowing a $500.00 benefit on each, calculated that under a discount provision
the Company would have a liability of $8,750,000.00.
Then the Court said as follows:
''It is evident that 'vith this tremendous potential liability, there should either he adequate provision for substantial reserves, or the la,vs of the
State should make it impossible for surh a situation to exist.''
27
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The Plaintiff ·feels tha.t it would be burdensome to
the C.ourt to quote any further cases, but many others·,
could he given. Each one of the cases referred to in this
Brief cites many. other cases from ·several juridictions.
The· Plaintiff would, however, like to refer the Court to
the following cases where complete burial equipment
and funeral services were promised. They were held
insurance contracts in every case ; See :

Capitol Hill Burial .Association V·. Oliver
(Okla.1939), 91 P. 2d 673
Gua~rdian Burial

Association v. Rodgers
(Tex. 1942), 163 S.W. 2d 851

Ken.ton & Campbell Benevolent Burial Association
v. Goodpastor (Ky. 1946), 200 S.W. 2d 120
Renschiler v. The State, by the Attorney General
(Ohio, 1914), 107 N.E. 748
· State v. Globe Casket a.nd Underta,king Company
(Wash. 1914), 143 Pac. 878
Many further cases are also accumulated and to be found
in 63 A.L.R. 723; 100 A.L.R. 1453, and 119 A.L.R. 1243.
The Contracts of the Defendant Companies now before the Court make no special, or any reference to
death. These Contracts either provide specially, or, at
least, imply that the goods and services can be demanded
a.t any time. This type of provision has been a problem
with the Courts and has been discussed in many cases.
May we refer you to a couple of such cases, and the decisions of the Courts.
28
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In the case of South Georgia Funera.l Home v. Harrison (Ga. 1936), 184 S.E. 875. The Funeral Home was
selling Option Contracts agreeing to provide ''caskets,''
"vaults," ''clothing," and other merchandise. * * *
"services of an Undertaker," "ambulance," and "hearse
services.''
The Court held this a Contract of Insurance, and
said:
''While the exercise of the Option is not expressly
made contingent upon the death of any of them,
the merchandise and the services may be bought
only for the use of, or in connection with the
'' Optionees'' their minor children, or dependents.
As a general proposition, we cannot conceive of
what use a casket, (burial clothes, funeral directions, etc.) would be to a. living person not engaged in the business of buying and selling such
commodities. Burial merchandise, and funeral
services are peculiar commodities ; they are presumably used only in connection with, or for use
of, a person who has departed from life.''
Therefore, the Court held the contingency of death
was sufficiently operational and held it insurance, and
not to be sold unless the company became licensed as an
Insurance Company.
In the case of State, by the Attorney General, v. The
Smith Funeral Service (Tenn. 1940), 145 S.,V. 2nd
1021, the Defendant funeral director had a charter from
the State to operate a funeral parlor, and to operate a.n
undertaking business, and to operate a· cemetery. They
proceeded to sell contracts providing for caskets, a
29
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hearse, funeral clothes, and other funeral benefits. They
had no death provisions as we have in our contracts before the Court. This company, also, manufactured and
sold caskets outright. Demand could also be made at
any time for the benefits of the Contract. The Court held
these Contracts insurance, and held that they could not
be sold in the State of Tennessee unless the Defendant
qualified as an insurance company, and, otherwise, met
the insuranee laws of the State. The Court proceeded
and said as follows :
''As suggested by the chancellor, only a rare and
eccentric individual would in person, or through an
agent purchase for himself a coffin and grave
clothes before· he died. Human nature is such that
the individual revolts at acquiring and possessing
during his lifetime such gruesome tokens of his
end. A person not abnormal would not have such
things around him during his lifetime.
Even though the Contracts could be matured before
death the Court said further :
"We are further of the opinion that the Defendant (Funeral Home) never contemplated in the
issuance of these Contracts that they would be
matured until the certificate holders died. * * *
furnish hearse service * * * handle details incident to a funeral, very plainly show that the Defendant (Funeral Home) was contracting in reverence to death.''
It is very obvious that the discussions on the Defendants' pre-need contracts, whether under Point III on the
Plaintiffs' claim that they are insurance, or whether under Point IV supporting the constitutionality of the pre-
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need law, that many arguments and decisions would overlap. May we point out that in a couple of citations being
used primarily to discuss Point IV on the constitutionality of pre-need contracts, the opportunity is taken by the
courts to also point out that pre-need contracts are basically insuranee contracts. This Court is referred to the
preliminary discussion contained on pages 1251 and 1252
of 68 A.L.R. 2nd, which will be specifically referred to
later. The Court's attention is also called to a discussion
of this matter in the case of West Virginia v. Memorial
Gardens Develop·ment Corporation (W. V a. 1957), 101
S.E. 2nd 425, 437-438 (Post) where numerous authorities
are referred to holding pre-need and burial contracts as
insurance contracts and subject to regulation under insurance laws.
ARGUMENT
POINT IV.
THAT CONTRARY TO THE LOWER
COURT'S DECISION, THOSE PORTIONS OF
SECTIONS 22-4-1. 22-4-2, 22-4-3, 22-4-4, 22-4-5
and 22-4-7 of THE PRE-NEED LAW OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, CHAPTER 39 OF THE 1955
LAWS OF UTAH AS A~IENDED BY CHAPTER 45 OF THE 1957 LAWS OF UTAH AND
WHICH SECTIONS ARE QUOTED I~ THE
T_JOWER COURT'S AMENDED JUDGMENT
OF DISMISSAL, DATED SEPTEMBER 18,
1964 (R. 46) ARE CONSTITUTIONAL.
The corporate Defendants have attacked Utah's preneed law as being unconstitutional on the ground that it
is not a valid exercise of the police power. There arc
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cases holding as the Defendants urge that such statutes
are invalid, however,. the substantial numerical weight
of authority upholds such statutes as being proper and
necessary to protect the public against abuses arising
from the sale of services and personal property to be delivered at a future date long after they may be completely
paid for. The danger to the public from permitting the
unregulated sale of funeral services far ahead of the time
they are going to be performed is obvious. It would be
an open invitation to fraud.. Furthermore, in the case of
even the most ethical and honest of companies, their financial stability cannot be presumed for the indefinite
f'uture. Regulation of this type of activity appears to be
in the public interest fully as much as is regulation of
banks or insurance companies.
The constitutionality of pre-need laws has been tested in several cases in several different states. The statutes in most, if not all, of these states were substantially
the same as the Utah statute {Chapter 39, La\\"'S of Utah
1955, and as amended in Chapter 45, Laws of Utah 1957).
The· states have not been uniform in their decisions.
A statute similar to ·our Utah statute ''Tas involved in
the case of Memorial Gardens Association, Inc. v. Smith
(TIL 19~9), 156 N.E. 2nd 578. The Court discusses generally the need of regulation to protect depositors, where
no immediate sale is involved but performance in the
fut,ure is involved, and security provided for by law is
proper regulation. The Court upheld the constitutionality of .the pre-need law and stated:
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"The enactment of Statutes having for their object the prevention of fraud, deceit, cheating and
imposition is_within the Police power of a State.''
·The State of Texas also. upheld the constitutionality
of a pre-need statute similar to Utah's in the case of
Falk'fber v. Memorial Gardens Association, (Texas 1957),
298 S.W. 2nd 934. It held it wa.s regulatory only and
not prohibitive or against public policy.
One of the main, if not the main case relied upon by
the Defendants in the lower Court was the case of Sta.te
of West Virginia v. Memorial Garden-s Development Corporation. (W.Va. 1958), 101 S.E. 2nd 425; 68 A.L.R. 2nd
1233. It held a Statute also similar to our Utah Statute
as unconstitutional. It is really disturbing to find that
after several pages .of discussion the West Virginia Court
said:
''Purchasers of property or services can ascertain, if they so desire, the reputation .of the sellers
and their financial condition, and if they do not,
it is not the fault of the State, if any loss to them
should ensue'' (Page 431).
The Court then went farther and argued that parties
should be left to themselves in making contracts, a1Hl
that ''even though it was popular to enact laws protecting the unsuspecting and incompetent in their purchases
gullibly made,'' (page 431), very, very few classes of business should be regulated and sales of funeral 'Contracts
least of all. The dissenting opinion in the West Virginia
case is extremely well written. It elaborates on the matter just referred to by the Plaintiffs as to what rlasses of
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business should be regulated and, contrary to the main
opinion, the dissenting· opinion shows how extensive regulation of business has become, and how well accepted
and advisable it is. The Texas Court in the case of Falkner v. Memorial Gardens Associalion, supra, cites and
follows the dissenting opinion in the West Virginia case
and says:

'' * * * There was a vigorous dissent from the
opinion which we believe contains the better reasoning and is more in accord with the general Judicial precedent upon the question.''
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado has also
ruled their pre-need law unconstitutional in the case of
Memorial Tru.sts, Inc., v. Berry (Colo. 1960), 356 Pac.
2nd 884.
The cases on this question are collected in 68 A.L.R.
2nd 1251-55. The West Virginia case is also in this
A.L.R. citation on pages 1233-1251.

SUl\IMARY
The Plaintiffs respectfully request this Honorable
Court to reverse the decision of the lower Court declaring:
(1) Any funeral director or embalmer, who performs funeral services or furnishes burial facilities pursuant to a pre-need contract obtained by solicitation by
any of the Defendants, solicited or sold by and for themselves, or which results to the benefit of a funeral di34
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rector or embalmer who performs the funeral services or
furnishes the burial facilities causes said Defendants to
become his agent and is guilty of unprofessional and unethical conduct as defined in Sections 5~-9-10 and 58-9-22
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
(2) That contracts sold by the Defendants are all
subject to the pre-need law of Utah, and the Contract used
and issued by the Defendant Me:rp.orial Trust, Inc., is particularly in violation of the pre-need law of the State of
Utah as contained in Section 22-4-4, Chapter 39, Laws of
Utah, ~955, and as amended in Chapter 45, Laws of Utah,
1957, and that said Defendants' pre-need contract particularly permits said Defendant to demand and receive
the earnings of the Trust Funds and pay said funds to
said Defendant contrary to the provisions of Section
22-4-4 aforesaid.
(3) That the pre-need contracts, being sold by the
Defendant companies and which are the subjects of controversy in this case, are insurance contracts and subject
to the insurance laws of this State and therefore, subject
to regulation by the Utah State Insurance Department,
and that the said Defendant companies, issuing said Contracts are also subject as Insurance Companies to the Insurance Laws of Utah and the regulations of the State
Insurance Department of the State of Utah. If this Honorable Court finds as requested in Point III, it is then
conceded that the Defendants thereby made subject to the
Insurance laws and regulations, would not be suhject to
the pre-need law as requested in Point II.
35

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

( 4) Tha.t those portions of Sections 22-4-1, 22-4-2,
22-4-3, 22-4-4, 22-4-5 and 22-4-7 of the Pre-need Law of the
State of Utah, Chapter 39 of the 1955 Laws of Utah as
amended by Chapter 45 of the 1957 L·aws of Utah and
which sections are quoted in the Lower Courts Amended
Judgment of Dismissal, dated September 18, 1964 (R. 46)
are constitutional.
Respectfully submitted,
C.N.OTTOSEN
CALVIN L. RAMPTON
of PUGSLEY, HALES, RAMPTON
& WATKISS
Attorneys for PlaintiffsA ppellan.ts
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